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The events of 9/11 brought an increased focus on security in the United States and 
specifically the protection of critical infrastructure.  Critical infrastructure encompasses a 
wide array of physical assets such as the electric power grid, telecommunications, oil and 
gas pipelines, transportation networks and computer data networks.  This paper will focus 
on computer data networks and the spatial implications of their susceptibility to targeted 
attacks.  Utilizing a database of national data carriers, simulations will be run to 
determine the repercussions of targeted attacks and what the relative merits of different 
methods of identifying critical nodes are.  This analysis will include comparison of 
current methods employed in vulnerability ana lysis with spatially constructed methods 
incorporating regional and distance variables.  In addition to vulnerability analysis a 
method will be proposed to analyze the fusion of physical and logical networks, and will 
discuss what new avenues this approach reveals. The results of the analysis will be placed 
in the context of national and regional security and economic impact.     
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The events of 9/11 brought a new focus to the vulnerability of the US economy to 
attack from malevolent forces.  As the world globalized and technology advanced in 
leaps and bounds over the last two decades, new infrastructures emerged – in addition to 
the roads, rail, and power networks, fiber optic grids connecting computers became vital 
to a new information economy.  The new interconnectedness of the globe and 
pervasiveness of information technologies, that enabled an economic revolution, are also 
now the tools that terrorists can use to attack the United States and its economy.  The 
dependence of the new economy on information has made the infrastructures that supply 
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it critical to the functioning and stability of the nation.  The new infrastructures of 
telecommunications and IT are “inherently spatial” (Falk and Abler 1980; Gillespie and 
Robins 1989).  Communication systems that lie at the heart of telecommunications and IT 
compress time and space, reducing, if not eliminating, the effects of distance (Atkinson 
1998; Brunn and Leinbach 1991; Cairncross 1997; Castells 1989; Negroponte 1995). The 
“death of distance” (Cairncross 1997) has led to wide speculation across many disciplines 
that the IT and telecommunications revolution would be an end to the “tyranny of 
geography” (Gillespie and Robins 1989).   
 
This disassociation of location has led to the common conception that the Internet 
and IT are virtual entities residing in cyberspace.  This same conception has resulted in a 
belief that security issues for the Internet and IT reside solely in cyberspace as well.  
While cyber-security concerns such as denial of service attacks, identity theft, and 
various other forms of hacking are serious security threats, they are not the only danger to 
the US information infrastructure.  The Internet and IT depend on physical fiber to 
connect the various computers, servers, switches, and routers that provide the 
underpinnings of the US information infrastructure.  All of these vital components have a 
physical location, but since the US information infrastructure is privately owned and 
proprietary these locations are most often undisclosed.  As a result there is no current 
map of the US information infrastructure (Internetweek 2001).  Without an aggregated 
network to map there is no process by which to determine if the network is susceptible to 
a targeted physical attack, and if so what nodes and links are most vital.   
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Current security mandates state that the telecommunications infrastructure is 
densely connected and that physical attack is unlikely to disrupt the network for extended 
periods of time (NRC 2002, NSTAC 2002).  While this assertion could be largely true for 
any one individual network, the susceptibility to attack of the interconnection of the mass 
of networks comprising the information infrastructure remains to be validated.  Empirical 
evidence has illustrated a high order of attack susceptibility for the interconnected router 
infrastructure of the Internet (Albert et al 2000, Callaway et al 2000, Cohen et al 2001).  
The average performance of the Internet would be cut in half if just 1% of the most 
highly connected routers were incapacitated and loses its integrity with 4% of the most 
connected routers destroyed.  Where are these top 1% and top 4% of routers?  Are they 
distributed enough that a coordinated attack would be infeasible?  Are the back up 
systems and redundancy of private providers sufficient to compensate for these 
susceptibilities?  These are just the first order of questions about the susceptibility of 
critical infrastructure to attack. Further areas of investigation include the dependencies of 
other critical infrastructures (finance and banking, electric power etc.) on information 
networks.  Also how can cyber-attacks be used in conjunction with attacks on physical 
infrastructure to compound damage for greater ripple effects in the economy?  
 
 This study is intended to begin to explore some of these issues.  Through 
mathematical and spatial analyses the study will attempt to gain a better understanding of 
the topology and structure of our nation’s complex telecommunications infrastructure – 
i.e., where the “critical” nodes and links are located in this network, and how the 
performance of the network is affected by the removal of certain nodes or links.  The 
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findings of this analysis will be used to derive a set of policy and planning 
recommendations on how best to mitigate the catastrophic and cascading effects that 
could occur as the result of a targeted physical and/or cyber attack on the nation’s 
telecommunications infrastructure.  In order to fully understand the implications of the 
issues addressed in this study and to identify related research efforts across various 
disciplines, the relevant literatures are next discussed.  This survey will briefly cover 
research of geographic networks and complexity research involving networks.  Following 
the literature review a methodology will be presented for vulnerability analysis of 
information networks and also an approach to fusing these operational networks with 
physical networks they run over for analysis.  Lastly, the results of the analysis will be 
placed in the context of national and regional security and economic impact.     
 
GEOGRAPHIC NETWORKS AND INFORMATION 
The most prominent aspect of the telecommunications and information revolution 
is its ability, through phenomena like the Internet and satellite transmissions; to connect 
geographically separated locations (that posses the appropriate technology levels).  There 
has been an increased attention of the spatial aspects of communications, but they have 
often overlooked the foundations of the spatial analysis of networks.  Social science and 
specifically geography has a deep tradition in network and spatial analysis.  Garrison and 
Marble (1962) did in-depth network analysis on the interstate highway system, analyzing 
the importance of nodes and links on location and development.  This same vein of 
research was greatly expanded through Garrison’s student Kansky (1963) and later with 
the work of Chorley and Haggett (1968).  In addition, Nyusten and Dacey (1968) and 
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later Taafee and Gauthier (1973) expanded this research, applying network analysis to 
telephone networks and general infrastructure.  This tradition of network analysis was 
picked up again by geographers to begin to analyze the Internet‘s network of networks. 
 
Specifically, examination of the backbone level of the Internet is an area that has 
enjoyed a significant level of analysis by geographers, planners, policy analysts, and 
regional economists (Wheeler and O’Kelly 1999, Moss and Townsend 2000, Gorman and 
Malecki 2000, Malecki and Gorman 2001, Grubesic and O’Kelly 2002, Townsend 2001, 
Choi et al 2001, Pelletiere and Rodrigo 2001).  The findings of this research have been 
remarkably consistent.  Backbone networks disproportionately agglomerate in the largest 
metropolitan areas, “The critical importance of access to new technologies has 
highlighted the characteristic diffusion pattern: hierarchical – beginning first in large 
cities, where the largest markets are found, and then to progressively smaller places 
(Malecki 1999)”.  These large markets cluster spatially into distinct groups like the 
Boston-Washington corridor and the LA-San Francisco complex that are fully 
interconnected to each other both by the telephone network (Langdale 1983) and the 
Internet backbones (Gorman and Malecki 1999; Moss and Townsend 1998; Wheeler and 
O’Kelly 1999).  The result is that the spatial hierarchy of the United States is unique; the 
coasts are more connected to each other than they are to the interior of the country – the 
coasts are the core and the interior is the periphery (Gorman and Malecki 2000). 
 
Statistical analysis has produced a very distinct profile for these highly connected 
hub cities.  Leading cities in advanced telecommunication services have been found to 
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have high concentrations of producer services, financial service (FIRE), low levels of 
manufacturing, high population, and high total personal income (McIntee 2001, Malecki 
2000, Gorman and McIntee 2001, Leyshon 1996, Warf 1995, Graham 1999).  Further, 
these cities are predominantly world cities that serve as hubs for information services as 
well as serving a command and control functions for global firms (Know and Taylor 
1995, Friedmann and Wolf 1982, Townsend 2001, Malecki 2002).   
 
The profile of these super-connected cities also influences the structure of the 
network at a micro level within the city.  Longcore and Rees’ (1996) examination of New 
York City’s financial district demonstrates meaningful analysis of information 
technology and networks at a very local level.  They found that in New York the historic 
Wall Street-centered financial district has had to disperse within the city to take 
advantage of buildings and real estate with sufficient built- in infrastructure and 
technology to handle the district’s specialized role in the information economy.  Without 
buildings lit by fiber optic connections financial district firms were disconnected from the 
global economy. 
 
Network analysis of the spatial networks of the Internet has only begun to be 
investigated.  Wheeler and O’Kelly (1999) examined the basic graph measures of several 
domestic US providers and analysis of city connectivity of the aggregated providers.  
Gorman and Malecki (2000) investigated the network topologies of several firms and 
how graph theoretic measures could be used to investigate competitive advantage and the 
nature of interconnection between networks.  Later studies have looked at the structure of 
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networks and city connectivity as a time series finding large changes in bandwidth 
capacity (Malecki 2002, Townsend 2001), but little change in graph measures of 
connectivity (O’Kelly and Grubesic 2002).  While connectivity indices have changed 
little over time the overall structure of the network has – Gorman (2001) found that the 
aggregated US backbone network has increasing self-organized from 1997 to 2000 
creating a more efficient but more sparsely connected network.  This research confirmed 
at a spatial level of analysis what was being found at a topological level in the study of 
complex networks. 
 
COMPLEXITY OF TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
 Telecommunications networks are large and complex, and the study of complex 
networks has enjoyed a flurry of new findings in the last few years.  The basis on 
studying large networks is built upon the work of Erdos and Renyi (ER).  Erdos and 
Renyi (ER) endeavored to use “probabilistic methods” to solve problems in graph theory 
where a large number of nodes where involved (Albert and Barabasi 2002, p. 54).  Under 
this assumption they modeled large graphs utilizing algorithms where N nodes were 
randomly connected according to probability P, and found that when vertices were 
connected in this fashion they followed a Poisson distribution (Albert and Barabasi 2002, 
p 49).  A more thorough review of random graphs can be found in the survey work of 
Bollobas (1985).   
 
The absence of detailed topological data for complex networks left random 
network models as the most widely used method of network simulation (Barabasi 2001).  
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Watts and Strogatz (WS)(1998) using several large data sets found that complex 
networks were not entirely random but instead displayed significant clustering at the local 
level.  Further, that local clusters linked across the graph to each other forming “small 
worlds”.  These short cuts across the graph to different clusters of vertices introduced a 
level of efficiency not predicted in the ER model and showed the first signs of self-
organization in complex networks.  The distribution was not Poisson as with the ER 
model, but was bounded and decayed exponentially for large sets of vertices.  These 
findings spurred a flurry of work into the attributes of complex networks and new 
findings and discoveries quickly followed.  In 1998 two parallel studies by Barabasi, 
Reka, and Jeong of Notre Dame and Huberman and Adamic at Parc Xerox found that 
when one looks at the World Wide Web as a graph (web pages are vertices and 
hyperlinks connecting them are edges) it followed not a Poisson or exponential 
distribution, but a power law distribution.   
 
A power law is a significantly different finding from eithe r the expected 
exponential or Poisson distribution.  In a power law distribution there is an abundance of 
nodes with only a few links, and a small but significant minority that have very large 
number of links (Barabasi 2001).  This is a distinct difference from both the ER and WS 
model that should be noted; the probability of finding a highly connected vertex in the 
ER and WS model decreases exponentially, thus vertices with high connectivity are 
practically absent (Barabasi and Albert 1999).  The reason, according to Barabasi and 
Albert, was that complex networks were not static; the number of nodes does not stay 
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constant as in the WS and ER model.  Complex networks grow over time and new 
vertices attach preferentially to already well-connected vertices in the network 
 
Barabasi and Albert (1999) formalized this idea in “Emergence of Scaling in 
Random Networks”.  They stated that in a complex network like the World Wide Web 
the probability P(k) that a vertex in the network interacts with k other vertices decays as a 
power law following P(k) ~ k-g .  Further, that this result indicates that large networks self 
organize into a scale-free state, a feature unpredicted by all existing random network 
models.  The Barabasi-Albert (BA) model is based on three mechanisms that drive the 
evolution of graph structures over time to produce power law relationships: 
 
1. Incremental growth – Incremental growth follows from the observation 
that most networks develop over time by adding new nodes and new links 
to existing graph structure. 
2. Preferential connectivity – Preferential connectivity expresses the 
frequently encountered phenomenon that there is higher probability for a 
new or existing node to connect or reconnect to a node that already has a 
large number of links (i.e. high vertex degree) than there is to (re)connect 
to a low degree vertex. 
3. Re-wiring – Re-wiring allows for some additional flexibility in the 
formation of networks by removing links connected to certain nodes and 
replacing them with new links in a way that effectively amounts to a local 
type of re-shuffling connection based of preferential attachment.   
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(Chen et al 2001 p.5) 
 
This difference between the ER and BA model become clear when seen in a 
visual representation, Figure 1 illustrates the structural difference between a random ER 
network model and a scale free network model. The high level of clustering and super-
connected node is evident on the node diagram.  For the model in Figure 1, “more than 
60% of nodes (green) can be reached from the five most connected nodes (red) compared 
with only 27% in the random network. This demonstrates the key role that hubs play in 
the scale-free network. Both networks contain the 130 nodes and 430 links” (Barabasi 
2001 p.3).  The implications of this were very broad for a number of disciplines as varied 
as genetics, economics, molecular physics and sociology.  One of the surprising findings 
was that not only did the World Wide Web fall into a scale free organization, but so did 
the Internet.   
 
The Faloutsos brothers (1999) found that the Internet followed power laws at both 
the router level and autonomous system (AS) level.  The router level entails the fiber 
optic lines (edges) and the routers (vertices) that direct traffic on the Internet, and the AS 
level entail networks (AT&T, UUNet, C&W etc.) as vertices and their interconnection as 
edges.  This meant that that the physical fabric of the Internet and the business 
interconnections of the networks that comprise the Internet both qualified as scale free 
networks.  Before these discoveries, the Internet had been modeled as a hierarchy and the 
new finding had many implications throughout the field of computer science.  The scale 
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free theory and BA model have not been without debate.  Several arguments have been 
made stating that the BA model and is too simplistic for the Internet and additional 
corollaries need to be made (Chen et al 2001).  The re-wiring principle was one response 
to these criticisms, but overall the model has held (Albert and Barabasi 2000).  Tests of 
network generators based on power laws have been found to produce better models and 
efforts are being made to base new Internet protocols on these discoveries  
(Tangmunarunkit et al 2001, Radoslavov et al 2001).  While these discoveries have paved 
the way for advancements in several fields the question of the geography and location of 
these networks remain to be addressed. 
 
ERROR AND ATTACK TOLERANCE OF COMPLEX NETWORKS  
Scale free networks have many implications, but a far-reaching consequence of 
their unique structure is they are very fault tolerant but also susceptible to attack (Albert 
et al 2000).  Research done at the Notre Dame Center on Self Organizing Networks found 
that a scale free network model remains connected when up to 80% of nodes are 
randomly removed from the network.  On the other hand, when the most connected nodes 
are removed the diameter of the network increases rapidly, doubling its original value if 
the top 5% of nodes are removed.  This work was confirmed by the analysis of Callaway 
et al (2000) modeling network robustness and fragility as a percolation and by Cohen et 
al (2001).  This work was extended to demonstrate that scale-free dynamical networks 
have the same robust and fragile properties under synchronization.  Preliminary analyses 
of these models on spatial network data have shown similar results when cities are the 
nodes and fiber connections between them are the links (Gorman and Kulkarni 2002).  
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Utilizing a different model of node connectivity and path availability Grubesic et al 
(forthcoming) find that the disconnection of a major hub city can cause the disconnection 
of peripheral cities from the network.  Spatial analysis of network failure has also been 
done for airline networks finding similar results for the Indian airline network (Cliff et al 
1979).  These findings have profound implications for telecommunications networks that 
have scale free properties. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to test the susceptibility of the spatial US information infrastructure to 
attack several approaches were developed building upon prior studies and literature.  
Several studies have noted that the removal of critical nodes caused a rapid degradation 
of the network.  Generally, these nodes are determined to be critical based on their level 
of connectivity, often referred to as an accessibility index in spatial network analysis.  
The first methodological step of this study was to determine which nodes are most critical 
and what is the best way to identify these nodes.  The next step is to test the set of nodal 
hierarchies and see which ranking method has the greatest impact on the network when 
nodes are targeted for failure and what the ripple effect of their removal is.  Lastly, an 
attempt will be made develop analysis that will allow the modeling of physical fiber 
networks with logical (operational) networks.  This approach will allow some 
understanding of the impact a cut or failure in the physical network will have on the 
logical network.  Data will be analyzed for each step of the methodology and conclusions 
will be drawn. 
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Nodal Hierarchies 
 
 There are several approaches to establishing nodal hierarchies within a network, 
and classical spatial network analysis has some standard approaches.  The most common 
of which is the accessibility index: 
 
 å
=
=
n
i
iji dA
1
     (1) 
 
The accessibility index provides the number of connections to a node; in the case of this 
study each MSA is considered a node.  Another derivation of the accessibility index is to 
look at not only the binary connectivity of a node, but also the capacity of those links: 
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c = capacity of the link 
 
While both of these approaches to nodal hierarchies provide useful insight into 
connectivity there are some drawbacks.  These nodal hierarchies are based on some  
fundamental assumptions: 
 
1. There are a certain number of discrete-classes of settlements. 
2. The number of settlements in each size class increases down the hierarchy. 
 14 
3. There is some characteristic spacing between nearest neighbors at any particular 
level. 
(Lowe and Moryadas 1975) 
 
The drawback of this approach is that it is based on a spatial-hierarchical structuring of 
an idealized Loschian landscape.  In a Loschian landscape nodes will connect and goods 
will flow based on proximity with larger places connecting to each other through 
intervening smaller places (Hagget 1966).  This approach is based on a planar network, 
where the intersection of any two links results in a node.  Information networks, though, 
are non-planar constructs where two distant places can be directly connected without 
intervening nodes being transited.   As a result traditional methods of determining nodal 
hierarchies might not be appropriate. 
  
Recent research into complex networks has found that information networks often 
form small world or scale free networks.  The general attribute of these formations is that 
there are formations of local clusters that are interconnected through global connections.  
This creates a highly efficient and sparsely connected network.  Vulnerability studies 
have focused on identifying the global connections in these systems and then targeting 
them for failure or attack (Albert et al 2000, Cohen et al 2001, Callaway et al 2001).  
These studies all found that removing the global connectors in the network led to 
catastrophic failure.  This leaves the question of how global connectors should be 
identified in a spatial network?  Further, how should local clustering and global 
connections be determined?   
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One approach is to use regions to define what is global and what is local (Gorman and 
Kulkarni 2002).  In this approach the United States is divided into the four census regions 
(South, West, Midwest, Northeast) and each city in the information infrastructure matrix 
was assigned to a census region.  For each city the number of local links to other cities in 
the same census region were totaled along with the number of global links connecting to 
cities in other census regions.  From this data the following approach was developed to 
identify cities that act as the super connected cities that provide the key global connection 
in the network: 
 
Consider a large network of n nodes, spanning an area A consisting of m regions, with 
variable number of nodes inside each region that have variable number of connections 
from each region to other regions. For a region r with p number of nodes, a pxp 
contiguity matrix represents connections between these nodes.  Then, one could construct 
a contiguity or adjacency matrix for the entire network of m regions, as a block diagonal 
matrix, where matrices along the main diagonal refer to the contiguity matrices for each 
of the regions, while interregional connections are represented as the off-block-diagonal 
elements. Let M denote such a matrix.  
 
If a node i in region r is connected to another node j in the same region, then that 
connection is considered as a local link and is denoted by ( ) ( )rjriq . On the other hand if 
node i in region r is connected to node k in region s then that connection is considered as 
a global connection and is denoted by ( ) ( )skrig .  Thus, in theory, one may associate with 
each node node i(r), a global connectivity index as a ratio between its global and local 
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connections, weighted by the total number of global and local connections for the entire 
network. 
 
The total number of global connections G are computed from the elements of the block 
upper triungular matrix of M, of  m regions, each with variable number of nodes:  
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Note that, since m is the last region in the block diagonal matrix, its global connections 
have already been computed in the previous m-1 blocks.  
 
The total number of local connections L is a sum over all the local connections over m 
regions and is given by: 
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Then the global connectivity index for a node i in region r is given by: 
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The numeral of 1 in the denominator indicates a self- loop of a node.  The ratio of global 
links to local links provides an indicator of how well the city acts as a global connector in 
the network and the weighting of the scores by the total number of links balances the 
measure with the overall connectivity of the node. 
 
This approach does have several drawbacks, most obvious being a border effect.  Those 
nodes located close to a border can have a very short link that crosses to another census 
region, artificially inflating the number of global connections.  An alternative approach is 
to base the global- local assignment with the Euclidean length of the link, a distance based 
small world.  Any link over x miles is considered global and anything under x miles is 
considered local.  This approach would yield the following equation: 
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The problem lies in what distance should be the cut off for what is considered global or 
local.  To gain some perspective on this problem the equation was automated, and a 
series of distances for D were simulated: 
 
Where  [ ]2700...300,200,100ÎD   (7) 
 
The simulations produced the graph seen in figure 2, where the x-axis is the increments 
of D tested and the y-axis is the percentage of nodes with a global to local ration greater 
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than one.  Figure 2 shows a sharp shift somewhere before 500 miles.  To find the exact 
point of inflection the rate of change in the global to local ration was calculated, as 
illustrated in figure 3.  The rate of change graph clearly points to 300 miles as being the 
point of inflection.  Under such an assumption all links shorter than 300 miles are 
considered local and all links over 300 miles are considered global.  Interestingly 300 
miles is very close to the mean distance of all links in the matrix, 308.6 miles.  Further, 
the average length of private leased lines (a different set of data) in the United States is 
300 miles (Coffman and Odlyzko 1999).  The recurring nature of 300 miles could point 
to a common spatial structure in the United States for communication networks.  This is 
an area that merits further investigation and possible cross-country comparisons.  
 
Another hierarchy was developed based on the distance small world approach 
looks at just the number of global connections a node has, and ranks them based on that 
count.  The equation would then be: 
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This ranking would provide an indicator of how many long haul global connections a city 
has.  The hypothesis being that the more global connections the greater the impact the 
loss of the node will have in connecting various clusters across the network.  A final 
approach considered for this study is to identify relay nodes and what effect they have on 
the survivability of the network.  Relay nodes are typically defined as locations that are 
neither the ultimate origin nor destination of an interaction across a network.   
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The primary purpose of a relay node is to receive flows in order to transmit them to 
another node with minimum delay and cost (Lowe and Moryadas 1975).  On the 
information networks like the Internet the definition of relay node is more fluid.  Nodes 
constantly shift from being origin, destination, or relay nodes.  This requires sorting of 
which nodes are disproportionately used as relay nodes.  Nodes that act as structural links 
to relay information to large markets could serve as critical junctures.  To sort out which 
nodes were disproportionately acting as relay nodes the following approach was 
developed 
 
å
å
=
=
n
i
ij
n
i
ij
b
c
1
1     (7) 
 
 Where cij = capacity and bij = business demand 
 
This approach provides a rough indicator of how much built capacity exceeds the 
consumption of capacity dictated by demand.  It is assumed that nodes with an aggregate 
disproportionate amount of excess capacity are using it to relay information to other 
destination nodes.  The hypothesis for a relay node hierarchy is that these nodes are 
structurally important in linking up large destination nodes and without them connection 
would be severely affected.    
 
With a series of nodal ranking approaches designed, a data set is needed to apply 
them to.  For this study a 2000 dataset of aggregated IP network providers was used 
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comprising of a matrix of 147 metropolitan statistical areas and the IP bandwidth 
available between each one (Malecki 2001).  It should be noted that the accuracy of the 
data is not perfect.  IP network provider’s maps often advertise more capacity than is 
currently in operation and future routes are often shown as current routes.  With the data 
accuracy shortcoming in mind the data does provide an adequate test base to compare 
algorithms and examine rough rankings.  Further, the aggregation of this dataset assumes 
that all networks interconnect with all other networks in every city they collocate in.  This 
is far from the case in reality, but provides a best-case scenario for testing purposes.  A 
more realistic model is being developed as a future direction of this study.  From this 
capacity matrix, a binary connectivity matrix and Euclidean distance matrix were 
constructed.  Finally business demand for the relay node hierarchy was calculated from 
FCC figures tabulated by Telegeography (2002).    The results of each hierarchy 
(accessibility, aggregate capacity, spatial small world, distance small world, and relay 
node) can be found in table 1 as part of the analysis results. 
 
In order to test these nodal hierarchies with the datasets outlined above each rank-
order was run through two simulations.  In the first simulation each node was 
successively removed according to its rank and the diameter of the network was 
measured for each removal.  The diameter of the network is the minimum number of 
hops it takes to get from the two furthest nodes on the network.  Mathematically this is 
expressed as: 
 
Diameter  =  maximum Dij Dij = shortest path (in links) between  
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                                       the ith and jth node 
 
The same simulation was run again, except this time instead of monitoring the diameter 
of the network the S-I index was examined.  The S-I index of a graph is based on the 
frequency distribution of the shortest path lengths sij in the graph.  It is defined as the pair 
(S,I), where: 
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According the Cliff et al (1979 p. 45) “The values of the S and I can be calculated for a 
variety of theoretical distributions based on the hypergeometric series, and can be 
mapped on the S-I plane.” The resulting S-I plane forms a hoop with one end indicating a 
fully meshed (interconnected network) and the other a minimally spanning tree.  By 
examining the S-I index of the US IP network infrastructure as nodes are removed one 
can get a quantitative indication of how disconnected the network becomes. 
 
The results of both the diameter and S-I index analysis can be found in table 2.  
The diameter results are the easiest to interpret and reveal some interesting findings.  The 
hierarchies with the largest effect on the diameter of the network were the small world 
distance hierarchy and the global hierarchy, both of which ended is a diameter of 16 
when the top 15 nodes (roughly 10%) were removed.  The starting diameter of the 
network in each case was 7 and the result of 16 was more than a doubling of the 
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diameter, meaning it took more than twice the number of hops to reach the two furthest 
places on the network.  This results in a ripple effect across the network where it will take 
a minimum of twice the time to get from any point to another.  This does not take into 
account the capacity of the links removed and how traffic will be redistributed across the 
network.  This is an area of ongoing research based on this study.  While both hierarchies 
end up at 16 the global hierarchy accelerates more rapidly in the beginning while the 
small world distance hierarchy accelerates the diameter more quickly at the end of the 
nodal hierarchy.    The next group of nodal hierarchies was the relay node and small 
world regional hierarchy which both end with a diameter of 12.  Finally, the binary and 
bandwidth capacity hierarchy had the least impact each ending in a diameter of 10.   
 
The diameter relationship of the hierarchies is seen more clearly when all the 
nodal hierarchies are plotted with their diameters at each successive node removal (figure 
4).  The lower impact of the binary and bandwidth hierarchy are very evident up to 
roughly the fifteenth node removal, when the diameter starts to vary erratically first for 
small world distance then global and finally small world regional.  The decrease in 
diameter results from the network Balkanizing into two or more sub-graphs.   The sub-
graph is a smaller subset of the whole network and thus has a lower diameter.  This is a 
significant juncture because individual places are no longer just being disconnected, but 
entire islands of nodes are being created, signifying a catastrophic failure of the network.  
Further, the bottom placement of the binary connectivity hierarchy is of note since this is 
the method by which nodes have been chosen for removal in the majority of studies in the 
literature (Albert et al 2000, Callaway et al 2000, Cohen et al 2001).  This would appear 
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to indicate that the most critical nodes in the network are not the most obvious ones, and 
judging nodes by only the agglomeration of links is not a sufficient method for examining 
the susceptibility of spatial networks.  The study does reveal that incorporating distance 
into an analysis of critical nodes for network survivability produces significantly 
improved results.  Finally, when it comes to the survivability of the Internet distance is 
hardly dead. 
 
 An examination of the S-I index confirms the findings of the diameter analysis.  
Figure 4 illustrates the S and I measure of the network as nodes are removed from the 
network, specifically the global hierarchy approach.  The graph clearly shows the similar 
effect S and I have with diameter as nodes are removed and the extreme sensitivity of S 
to network changes.  The graphical approach is different from the typical plotting of the S 
and I onto the S-I plane as (X,Y) coordinates, but works well in this case to one 
demonstrate the connection between diameter and the S-I measures, and two show how 
increases in the S-I index are indicators of a disconnecting network. 
 
PHYSICAL DISJOINT ANALYSIS 
 
The methodology and approaches outlined thus far have only dealt with one facet 
of US infrastructure, networks that operate with Internet protocol (IP).  These IP 
networks are operational constructs and their topology is logical not physical.  The nodes 
in an IP network are physical places but they way they are connected are not.  The map of 
a typical IP network will show direct connections between far- flung places like New 
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York and San Francisco or Seattle and Chicago.  The logical connections of IP networks 
are carried over physical fiber in the ground, which form much different network 
constructs.  Physical fiber networks typically run over rights of way established by 
physical transportation networks – roads, railroads, pipelines, or sewers.  Fiber is laid 
connecting several cities and then either leased to provide connectivity to other networks 
or to run the networks of the fiber provider.  These operational networks then choose 
from a variety of protocols and technologies to set up an operational network to connect 
their key assets.  The most popular current protocol is IP and the most popular network is 
the Internet, but there are wide variety of other protocols and networks that utilize the 
leased lines of physical fiber networks.  A wide variety of critical infrastructures depend 
on leased lines for their operation, ranging from banking and finance to military 
command and control.  The aggregate private leased lines in the United States dwarf the 
bandwidth available on the Internet – in 1997 leased lines accounted for 330 Gbps and 
the Internet only 75 Gbps (Coffman and Odlyzko 1999).  .  This relationship has only 
intensified with the telecom boom and bust: 
 
with very few exceptions all ISPs have typically just a single OC48 or at most 
OC192 link along their major routes. Yet the facilities based carriers typically 
have between 40 and 800 fibers along each route, and each fiber is usually 
capable (with current DWDM technology) of carrying 80 OC48 or OC192 
wavelengths.  Thus only a small fraction of the fiber capacity is currently used for 
Internet traffic (Odlyzko 2002 p.5). 
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The vast majority of this capacity remains unused or is allocated to private leased lines.  
In fact, if you take the top twenty US cities and average how much lit bandwidth is used 
for the Internet it is only 1.37% of the total (based on Telegeography 2002).  While the 
Internet is a small percentage of total capacity it is a much larger percentage of traffic 
averaging 2,500-4000 TB a month compared to 3,000-5,000 TB a month for private lines 
(Coffman and Odlyzko 1999).  As such the Internet is a good indicator of a very active 
operational network.   
 
 The often-confusing part is that the Internet is collection of interconnected 
private lines and networks.  The difference between the categories outlined by Coffman 
and Oldyzko (1999) is that the Internet all runs on TCP/IP and the individual private 
networks (autonomous systems) agree to interconnect with each other under a common 
framework.  Where as private lines, in their classification, are not openly accessible for 
interconnection under a common framework and protocol.  This still leaves the problem 
of how does one analyze a network that has two components, one physical and one 
logical with two different topologies.  One approach is physical disjoint analysis 
developed by Bhandari (1999), where a logical network is overlaid on the physical 
network it runs over.  In this graph theoretical construct a new terminology is added, 
spans and span nodes.  Spans are the actual physical links that comprise the network and 
logical links are built from these spans.  Thus, a given span can be common to a number 
of links, and several spans can combine to form a single logical link (Bhandari 1999).  
Once a physical and logical network is combined there are logical links and nodes and 
span links and nodes.  This approach makes more sense when illustrated visually.  Figure 
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6 is the physical fiber network for Genuity and Figure 7 is the logical IP network that 
runs over the physical fiber network.  Figure 8 illustrates the combination of the physical 
fiber and operational IP network into one map.   
 
 The goal of physical disjoint analysis is to examine these two network as graphs 
and determine how many physically disjoint paths exist between any two places on the 
network.  Thus, if there were a physical fiber cut would there be another physical path for 
the data to follow to arrive at its destination.  Mathematically the edge disjointness (ED) 
for a pair of paths can be defined as: 
 
 å
å-=
i
j
l
l
ED 1   (9) 
 
Where the j sum is over the common edges of the two paths and the i sum is over the 
edges of the two paths.  This approach becomes clearer when framed as a visual example.  
In the Genuity example above how many physically disjoint paths are there between San 
Francisco and New York?  While there is a direct connection between San Francisco and 
New York in the logical network it requires a minimum of 7 physical links to connect the 
two.  There is also a second route that does not use any links in the 7- link path, 
comprising a completely physically disjoint path with 11 links.  Thus its ED would be 1 
since there are no common edges shared between the two.  If there was a shared path then 
the ED would be 1 – (1/11+7) = .944.  While this approach provides a good tool for 
examining specific routes it does not give any insight to the system dynamics of the 
network or the criticality of links in a route.  Building upon the ED approach the two 
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physically disjoint paths illustrated between San Francisco and New York were analyzed 
to see what the impact of two strategic cuts would have on the logical network.  One cut 
was made between Denver and Kansas on the 7- link disjoint path and the other cut 
between El Paso and Houston on the 11- link route.  Cut one results in the loss of 8 logical 
connections and cut two results in the loss of two logical connections and the 
disconnection of the East and West coast.  This provides only the characteristic for the 
routes between two nodes.  In order to examine how critical these two links are for the 
entire network a link frequency analysis was constructed.  This approach analyzes the 
frequency for which a particular link must be traversed for each iteration of a network 
until the diameter of the network is reached.  Thus the first iteration would examine how 
many times link x would have to be traversed in all combinations of two hop routes, and 
the third iteration would be the percentage of times a link had to be traversed fo r all three 
hop combinations and so on, till the diameter was reached.  When this analysis was run 
for the two links under examination in the Genuity fiber network the results seen in table 
3 were produced.  The results show that for all two-hop combinations in the network the 
two links are utilized in 15% of routes.  This number increases for each iteration of the 
network until 97% of all routes utilize these two link for all 7-hop combinations and 
100% of all 8-hop combinations are dependent on these two links.  This approach can 
also be used to rank the relative importance of links of the network and calculate how 
many logical connections are dependent on them as illustrated earlier.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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Identifying and determining the location of vital nodes in US critical 
infrastructure has taken on renewed importance since the events of 9/11.  The critical 
infrastructure of today’s economy has grown from transport and utilities to include 
information networks like the Internet, telecommunications, and various financial 
networks.  These networks are structurally different from traditional infrastructure 
networks, and this paper has endeavored to develop new methods of identifying critical 
nodes and links in them.  The new approaches developed had a far greater impact on the 
connectivity of the network than traditional approaches.  Interestingly distance based 
approaches (small world distance model and global hierarchy model) had the greatest 
impact on the network, and outperformed traditional measures (accessib ility and capacity 
models) by 62.5%.  These results reveal the important role distance plays in the structural 
properties of small world and scale free networks, especially in the case on information 
infrastructure networks.  Also of note is the reoccurring importance of 300 miles as a 
threshold in distance analysis of information networks.  It was the critical inflection point 
between global and local in this study, the average length of leased lines in the Coffman 
and Odlyzko (1999) study, and the average logical link length in this study.  It would 
appear, that in the case of vulnerability, distance has avenged the premature calls of its 
demise (Cairncross 1999).   
 
This analysis has also put forward a preliminary method of analyzing the 
interactions of physical and logical networks.  Utilizing the concept of spans from 
Bhandari (1999) it is possible perform physical disjoint analysis and determine the impact 
of physical fiber cuts on a logical network.  The approach was extended to allow an 
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overall system analysis to determine the criticality of physical links to the operation of a 
logical network.  This allows vulnerability analysis of operational networks and the 
private line infrastructure they are dependent on at both a micro and macro level.  This is 
a first step in analyzing the interdependencies of various information networks (financial, 
military, aviation, energy) and the fiber infrastructure they are dependent on.   
 
Applying the analysis of this paper to create public policy recommendations 
proves to be a difficult task.  Unlike traditional infrastructures fiber networks are almost 
entirely held by private firms.  Multiple providers supply the infrastructure, often 
interconnecting with each other and always in tight competition, creating unique 
interdependencies.  One network’s security is only as good as the other networks it 
interconnects with (Kunreuther et al 2002).  Thus there is not a direct economic incentive 
to secure a network if it can be compromised by the competition, a classic case of 
prisoner’s dilemma.  In a telecommunications industry experiencing its largest economic 
downturn in history the incentive for security is only further pushed to the rear.  This 
raises the question, is a policy intervention needed if the market is not fulfilling the role 
of providing adequate security measures?  This question goes outside of the scope of this 
paper, but the analysis does point out some fundamental recommendations that should be 
fulfilled by the market or a policy intervention: 
 
1. Technological and market forces have reduced available reserve capacity and 
the number of geographically diverse routing paths. 
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2. Failure of single links and nodes can have serious repercussions and having 
back up providers is not always a safe solution 
 
3. Operational networks need to be mapped to physical networks to determine 
susceptibilities. 
 
The best way to secure information networks to cyber and physical attack remains an 
open question with large implications for the US economy and national security. 
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Table 1. Output of Diameter and S-I Index Analysis on Nodal Hierarchies 
 
 Binary Hierarchy  
Diameter CMSA I=u2/u1 S=u3/u2 
7  0.2937 0.0499 
8 Atlanta 0.3416 0.0927 
8 Chicago 1 0.3445 0.0449 
8 San Francisco 1 0.3466 0.0424 
10 Dallas 2 0.4415 0.4056 
10 Washington 1 0.4441 0.3019 
10 New York 1 0.4463 0.3133 
10 Denver 2 0.4602 0.3656 
10 Houston 0.5313 0.4742 
10 Kansas City 0.5410 0.3871 
10 Los Angeles 0.5085 0.2671 
10 Cleveland 0.5037 0.2268 
10 St. Louis 2 0.5096 0.1999 
10 Salt Lake City 0.5069 0.1805 
10 Boston 2 0.5145 0.1185 
10 Phoenix 0.5374 0.1309 
 
 Band Width Hierarchy  
Diameter CMSA I=u2/u1 S=u3/u2 
7  0.2937 0.0499 
8 New York 1 0.3029 0.0454 
8 Chicago 1 0.3063 -0.0125 
8 San Francisco 1 0.3084 -0.0135 
9 Dallas 2 0.4029 0.4381 
9 Washington 1 0.4086 0.3767 
10 Atlanta 0.4442 0.2252 
10 Los Angeles 0.4205 0.1234 
10 Seattle 0.4188 0.1110 
10 Denver 2 0.4255 0.1322 
10 Kansas City 0.4391 0.0860 
10 Salt Lake City 0.4376 0.0664 
10 Houston 0.4976 0.1549 
10 Boston 2 0.5530 0.1408 
10 Philadelphia 0.5533 0.1429 
10 St. Louis 2 0.5624 0.1237 
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 Small World Regional Hierarchy 
Diameter CMSA I=u2/u1 S=u3/u2 
7  0.2937 0.0499 
8 New York 1 0.3029 0.0454 
8 Chicago 1 0.3063 -0.0125 
8 San Francisco 1 0.3155 -0.0468 
8 Washington 1 0.3318 -0.0793 
9 Boston 2 0.3938 0.2081 
10 Dallas 2 0.4804 0.4802 
10 Denver 2 0.4962 0.5025 
10 St. Louis 2 0.4982 0.4890 
11 Cleveland 0.5915 0.6812 
11 Louisville 0.5933 0.6759 
11 Kansas City 0.6600 0.5959 
12 Seattle 0.7778 0.9118 
12 Phoenix 0.7752 0.8822 
12 Los Angeles 0.7622 0.8810 
12 Atlanta 0.7656 0.4362 
 
 Small World  Distance Hierarchy 
Diameter CMSA I=u2/u1 S=u3/u2 
7  0.2937 0.0499 
8 Salt Lake City 0.2935 0.0399 
8 Denver 2 0.3003 0.0573 
8 San Francisco 1 0.3061 0.0246 
9 Dallas 2 0.4081 0.5258 
9 Seattle 0.4072 0.5149 
9 Chicago 1 0.4194 0.4465 
9 Los Angeles 0.3841 0.2800 
10 Atlanta 0.4205 0.1839 
10 Washington 1 0.4420 0.0249 
10 New York 1 0.4394 -0.1134 
10 Phoenix 0.4583 -0.0784 
11 Houston 0.5412 0.1520 
13 Miami 0.7341 0.6719 
14 Boston 2 0.9572 0.8135 
16 Kansas City 1.3219 1.1954 
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 Global Hierarchy  
Diameter CMSA I=u2/u1 S=u3/u2 
7   0.2937 0.0499 
8 San Francisco 1 0.2981 0.0258 
8 Atlanta 0.3489 0.0779 
8 Chicago 1 0.3518 0.0169 
10 Dallas 2 0.4384 0.3208 
10 Denver 2 0.4503 0.3691 
10 Washington 1 0.4717 0.1825 
10 New York 1 0.4672 0.0570 
10 Salt Lake City 0.4649 0.0189 
10 Los Angeles 0.4427 -0.0806 
10 Houston 0.4932 -0.0264 
11 Kansas City 0.5306 -0.0190 
11 Seattle 0.5317 -0.0705 
12 Phoenix 0.6464 0.2665 
13 Boston 2 0.8097 0.3425 
16 Miami 1.3219 1.1954 
 
Diameter Relay Node Hierarchy  
 MSA I=u2/u1 S=u3/u2 
7  0.2937 0.0499 
8 Kansas City 0.2958 0.0405 
8 Salt Lake City 0.2956 0.0302 
8 Indianapolis  0.2949 0.0227 
8 Seattle 0.2942 0.0137 
10 Portland 0.3654 0.6527 
10 Sacramento 0.3834 0.7821 
10 St. Louis  0.3866 0.7927 
10 Denver 0.4063 0.7470 
10 Atlanta 0.4248 0.5493 
10 Washington-Baltimore 0.4254 0.4537 
10 Chicago 0.4285 0.3020 
10 Philadelphia 0.4291 0.2970 
10 Orlando 0.4412 0.2912 
12 Jacksonville 0.5249 0.6122 
12 Phoenix 0.5237 0.6021 
  
 
Table 2. Link Frequency Analysis for the Genuity Fiber Network 
 
2 hops 3 hops 4 hops 5 hops 6 hops 7 hops 8 hops Total
Denver - Kansas 5 11 18 23 34 34 23 148
El Paso - Houston 4 8 19 24 27 31 15 128
Both Cuts 9 19 37 47 61 65 38 276
Total Paths 60 79 95 97 86 67 38 522
% of Total 0.15 0.24 0.39 0.48 0.71 0.97 1.00 0.53
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Figure 1:  Comparison of Exponential and Scale-Free Networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Red dots are the five nodes with the highest number of links; green, their first 
neighbors. In the exponential network only 27% of the nodes are reached by the five most 
connected nodes, in the scale-free network more than 60% are reached, demonstrating the 
importance of the connected nodes in the scale-free network Both networks contain 130 
nodes and 215 links (k  = 3.3). 
 
Source:  Barabasi, A. (2001)  
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Fig  2 .  Local  to  Global  L inks Rat io  by  Distance
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Fig 3. Rate of Change of Local to Global Link Ratio
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Figure 4. Comparison of the Diameter Effects of Nodal Hierarchies
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Figure 5. Global Hierarchy: S and I Index and Diameter of the Network  
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Figure 6 
 
Fiber Network
 
 
Figure 7 
Logical Network
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Figure 8 
 
 
 
 
